Can you please expand on why D is wrong? Author of passage B seems to disagree with passage A because B states that the claim that chimpanzees do not have the ability to attribute to another' mind is called into question by new research, whereas passage A says that it's irrefutable that chimpanzees do not intentionally communicate in order to convey thoughts but communication is inadvertent.
Replies
Create a free account to read and
take part in forum discussions.
(D) is wrong because the author of passage A believes that chimpanzees could attribute mental states to others - "most animals, with the possible exception of chimpanzees, cannot attribute mental states to others." (lines 10-11). Passage A makes a distinction between intentional communication and an ability to attribute mental states.
Let me know if you have any other questions.
tomgbeanon November 7, 2019
@Irina, you did not address the point I am trying to understand. Passage A says that chimpanzees cannot attribute mental states to others intentionally (it's inadvertent) and passage B states that what is called into question is also "the accompanying assumption that animals respond
.mechanically to stimuli, whereas humans speak with
(65)conscious understanding and intent."
Skylaron November 14, 2019
@tomgbean Maybe I can help!
I think your main confusion here is coming from the intentionality element. This is not mentioned in (D), and therefore irrelevant as a distinction.
(D) states that the authors of the two passages would disagree over "whether chimpanzees' vocalizations suggest that they may possess the capacity to attribute mental states to others."
Passage A states that "most animals, with the possible exception of chimpanzees, cannot attribute mental states to others." Therefore, the author accepts that chimpanzees may be able to attribute others' mental states. You point out that chimpanzees are only able to do this inadvertently and not consciously, but this is irrelevant because (D) does not include anything about the element of consciousness or intentionality. Therefore, we can conclude that the author of Passage A would agree that chimpanzees' vocalizations suggest that they may possess the capacity to attribute mental states to others (whether or not this capacity is intentional is irrelevant).
Passage B says the idea that animal communication is a rigid response to stimuli that is unrelated to intent is called into question. This suggests that the author of Passage B believes that it may be possible for animal communication to be more similar to human communication, including perhaps having the ability to attribute mental states to others. Therefore, the author of Passage B could agree with the author of Passage A that chimpanzees may possess the capacity to attribute mental states to others.
Does that make sense? Let us know if you have any additional questions!
