June 2007 LSAT Question Explanations June 2007 - Sec 2 - LR...

June 2007 - Sec 2 - LR - Q23

Video Transcript:

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Question 23.
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Philosopher: An action is morally right if it would be reasonably expected to increase
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the aggregate well-being of the people affected by it.
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An action is morally wrong if and only if it would be reasonably expected to reduce
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the aggregate well-being of the people affected by it.
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Thus, actions that would be reasonably expected to leave unchanged the aggregate well-being
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of the people affected by them are also right.
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First step, argument or facts?
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Clearly, we have an argument, structural indicator of "thus," our conclusion, the last sentence
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that ?actions that would be reasonably expected to leave unchanged the aggregate well-being
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of the people affected by them are also right.?
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How do we know that?
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The philosopher gives us a number of general principles and we notice sufficient and necessary
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terminology.
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In the first sentence, "if" and the second sentence, "if and only if.?
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So let's diagram these.
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The first sentence we know ?if? introduces a sufficient condition.
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So our first principle is reasonably expected to increase the aggregate well-being of the
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people affected by it.
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Reasonably expected to increase the aggregate well-being of the people affected by it, then
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we know the action is morally right.
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Contrapositive, if it's not morally right, then it is not reasonably expected to increase
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the aggregate well-being of the people affected by it.
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The next sentence, ?an action is morally wrong if and only if it would be reasonably
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expected to reduce the aggregate well-being of the people affected by it.?
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Again, we know that ?if and only if? is sufficient and necessary.
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Morally wrong would be sufficient for reasonably expected to reduce the aggregate well-being
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of the people affected by it.
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But it is also necessary, which would make reasonably expected to reduce the aggregate
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well-being sufficient.
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Contrapositives here if it is not expected to reduce the aggregate well-being, then it
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is not morally wrong.
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Then if it is not morally wrong, it is not expected to reduce the aggregate well-being
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of the people affected by it.
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From that, the author concludes, therefore, or thus in this case, actions that would be
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reasonably expected to leave unchanged the aggregate well-being of the people affected
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by them are also right.
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Reasonably expected to keep the aggregate well-being unchanged or constant they're also
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morally right.
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Does that conclusion follow?
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If you notice, we only have morally right in our first principle and the sufficient
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condition there was that it was reasonably expected to increase the aggregate well-being
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of the people affected by it.
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In our conclusion, our sufficient condition is reasonably expected to keep the aggregate
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well-being constant, unchanged, which is not the same thing as increasing it.
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So that's not working.
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Let's think.
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If it is reasonably expected to keep the aggregate well-being unchanged wouldn't that mean that
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it is not reducing the aggregate well-being?
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Keeping it unchanged is the same thing as saying you're not reducing it.
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However, that is sufficient for not morally wrong.
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Our conclusion here was morally right.
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You notice that this argument makes a jump from not morally wrong to morally right.
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This is a flawed argument.
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There is a missing assumption here.
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Since we know reasonably expected to leave the aggregate well-being unchanged is the
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same thing as reasonably expected not to reduce the aggregate well-being.
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If it's unchanged, then it's not reducing it.
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We know from our second principle?s contrapositive that that is sufficient for not morally wrong.
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Which would be the correct conclusion here.
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The conclusion is morally right.
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Now that we've clearly identified that this argument is flawed, let's proceed to the question
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stem, ?The philosopher's conclusion follows logically if which one of the following is
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assumed.?
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And you notice follows logically if?
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This is a Strengthen with Sufficient Premise question.
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Where again we are trying to 100% guarantee the conclusion that if it's going to leave
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the aggregate well-being unchanged, then it's morally right.
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Again, we know that if it leaves the aggregate well-being unchanged that's the same thing
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as not reducing the aggregate well-being, which tells us that it's not morally wrong.
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If we want to guarantee that it's morally right, therefore, we would say that if you're
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not morally wrong, you are morally right.
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Looking for an answer choice that ties not being morally wrong to being morally right.
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(A) Only wrong actions would be reasonably expected to reduce the aggregate well-being
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of the people affected by it.
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Again, we know ?only? introduces necessary, so wrong actions, making our sufficient condition
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reasonably expected to reduce the aggregate well-being and you notice (A) adds nothing.
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Again, assuming wrong actions here is the same thing as morally wrong.
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You notice that is what we have here from our second principle.
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(A) adds nothing new, so (A) would be eliminated.
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How could that strengthen the argument, let alone, guarantee it?
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It's already there.
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(B) No action is both right and wrong.
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?Not both.?
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So if you are right, then you are not wrong.
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If you are wrong, than you are not right.
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The problem here is that we know that it's not morally wrong.
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We can't take the fact that it's not wrong to come backwards and conclude that it's right.
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That would be incorrect, flawed logic.
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We know we don't just reverse.
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So while (B) does tie the idea of right and wrong together, it doesn't do it properly
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to guarantee this conclusion.
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(B) would be eliminated.
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Which brings us to (C).
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Any action that is not morally wrong is morally right.
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We know ?any? introduces sufficient.
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If you are not morally wrong, then you are morally right.
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You notice that is exactly what we said we needed to guarantee the conclusion.
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(C), here, would be the correct answer as it 100% guarantees the conclusion.
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Because, again, we know that if you are reasonably expected to leave the aggregate well-being
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unchanged, that is the same thing as being reasonably expected not to reduce the aggregate
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well-being and the contrapositive of our second general principle told us that if you are
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not reasonably expected to reduce the aggregate well-being, then you are not morally wrong.
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Now (C) tells us if you're not morally wrong, then you are morally right and that is the
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conclusion of this passage.
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So (C) is clearly the correct answer.
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Again, just making sure, (D), there are actions that would be reasonably expected to leave
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unchanged the aggregate well-being of the people affected by them.
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Okay, great, but that just tells us that they're not morally wrong.
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We still need to get to the point that they're morally right.
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All (D) is telling us is that there are actions that would be reasonably expected to leave
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unchanged the aggregate well-being of the people affected by them.
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So we have our sufficient condition that reasonably expected to not reduce the aggregate well-being
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of the people affected by them.
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Which tells us that they're not morally wrong, but again, doesn't get us to morally right,
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so (D) doesn't help us.
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(E) Only right actions have good consequences.
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Good consequences is completely irrelevant.
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What does that have to do with this passage?
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Does not strengthen, definitely does not guarantee, so (E) would be eliminated.